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Abstract—With network attacks becoming more sophisticated
and unpredictable, detecting their onset and mitigating their
effects in an automated manner become increasingly challenging.
Lightweight and agile detection mechanisms that are able to
detect zero-day attacks are in great need. High true-negative
rate and low false-positive rate are the most important indicators
for a intrusion detection system. In this paper, we exploit the
logically-centralised view of Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
to increase true-negative rate and lower false-positive rate in a
intrusion detection system based on the Artificial Immune System
(AIS). We propose the use of an antibody fuser in the controller to
merge and fuse the mature antibody sets trained in the individual
switches and turn the real intrusion records each switch has seen
into antibodies. Our results show that both the false-positive rate
and true-negative rate experience significant improvement with
the number of local antibody sets fused grows, consuming less
cpu usage overhead. A peak improvement can reach over 80%
when antibody sets from all switches are taken into consideration.
Index Terms—Artificial immune system, Intrusion detection,
Software Defined Networking
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is gaining significant traction as we in-
creasingly rely on ICT infrastructures for industry, economics,
communication, and other domains. One of the most important
fields in cyber security is anomaly and intrusion detection,
which deals with defining normal network behaviour, and
subsequently identifying deviations from that pattern.
The Artificial Immune System (AIS) which is inspired by
the observed mammalian immune process is naturally tuned
to the problem of detecting anomalies. By detecting certain
activities that deviate from what has been defined as normal,
the AIS exhibits many virtues that are highly desired by a
network anomaly detection system. These include: autonomy,
robustness, light-weightiness, and adaptivity [1]. Hence, artifi-
cial immune systems have been explored for network intrusion
detection [1], [2], [3], [4].
By abstracting network management operations into an
centralised control plane, Software Defined Networking (SDN)
is able to construct a global knowledge base that enables more
advantaged security management. Various approaches have
been proposed using SDN for intrusion detection, bringing
the following benefits: 1) With the programmable control
plane, it is easier to collect flow-related traffic features [5]; 2)
based on SDN’s centralised control, it is more convenient to
collect information and do network statistics analysis [6]; 3)
With the global view of network traffic, we can orchestrate
the decision making strategy, and achieve higher accuracy
while avoiding false positives [7]. It is worth mentioning
that, although currently every network adopting OpenFlow is
deemed as a deployment of SDN, SDN itself has wider scope
than that. OpenFlow is just one prototype protocol realisation
of SDN [8].
In this paper, we propose BIDS (Bio-Inspired, collaborative
intrusion Detection for SDN), an AIS-based network Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) to exploit the centralised orchestration
of SDN. The distributed AIS IDS is running on each switch in
a network, while an antibody fuser running on the controller
orchestrates the training results from all the switches. At
the beginning, each IDS component is trained by the local
traffic seen at the switch. After the training process, the
mature antibody sets trained and the intrusion set recorded by
each switch will be collected by the controller, where they
will be fused by the antibody fuser as one global mature
antibody set and subsequently synced with all switches. Thus,
with knowledge of global traffic and intrusions experienced
throughout the network, the false positive rate will be reduced
while the true-negative rate increases.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II provides the state of art in AIS-based intrusion detection.
We detail the architecture of the proposed system in Section
III. Experimental design and evaluation results are presented
in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
An AIS is an abstraction of the sophisticated mammalian
immunological process which is still developing to date.
The mapping between the mammalian immune process and
network intrusion detection based on AIS can be seen in
Table I. The network is compared to the human body while
switches are the lymph glands. The gene segment patterns of
antibodies and antigens are modelled as binary strings with
fixed length l. Thus, the self and non-self discrimination is
defined by the matching rule of binary strings. Matching rules
are key for AIS, since they determine the matching process.
Since 1994, when the AIS was first explored for network
security, the fundamental algorithm has not changed much [1],
[2], [3], [4], [9]. However, various frameworks have been
proposed by different groups. An ARTificial Immune System
(ARTIS) was proposed by Hofmeyr et al. [1] in 1999. It
abstracts TCP traffic into a “datapath triple” – “source IP
TABLE I
THE MAPPING BETWEEN MAMMALIAN IMMUNE SYSTEM TO ARTIFICIAL
IMMUNE NETWORK
Mammalian Immune System Network Intrusion
Detection System
Human Body Network
Lymph Gland Switch
Antigen Binary strings extracted from IP packets
Cell B, T, and Antibody Binary strings
Binding between R-contiguous rule
Antibody and Antigen
Toleration Negative selection
address, destination IP address, TCP service type”, represented
by a 49-bit binary string. Based on previous work, Hosseinpour
et al. [3] proposed an evolved framework, distributing the
training and detection function to each switch as an agent of
the central intrusion detection engine which is located on the
server and only process the initial detection result reported by
switches to make final detection decisions. The antibodies and
antigens they designed are 112-bits binary strings, containing
the following information from TCP packets: source and
destination IP address, source and destination port number,
packet length, and protocol.
To our knowledge, there has not been any work on AIS-
based IDS for SDN. However, intrusion detection for SDN has
been widely investigated, and most of the proposed approaches
are based on the flow tuple. In [11], the authors proposed
BroFlow, an policy-based IDS that takes advantage of Open-
Flow APIs. By collecting flow statistics and calculating the
entropies, Giotis et al. proposed an IDS to detect massive
DDoS over SDN [5]. Tang et al. proposed a deep learning
model based IDS for SDN [13]. Even though our work is
based on previous work by Forrest et al. [4] and Hosseinpour
et al. [3], there are several implementations that are different,
as shown below.
• In the antibody training process, not only is normal traffic
data collected as a self set, but the history of intrusions
experienced by the switch are also collected as the local
intrusion set. The immature antibodies will be trained by
both the self and the intrusion sets to reduce the false-
positive rate.
• The local mature antibodies generated after the training
process in each switch are collected by the controller,
where they are fused and merged to a final antibody set.
This antibody set will be synced with all the switches and
work as the detector for future intrusions. Once a match
is found, an alert of intrusion will be send to the network
admin.
III. AIS-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION
In this section, we describe our proposed BIDS based
on AIS. The main purpose of the proposed IDS is to take
advantage of the global control of SDN to reduce false-positive
rates without affecting true-negative rates. Fig. 1 shows the
fundamental design of BIDS. The antibody generator and the
trainer are located at each switch, while the antibody sets
generated are collected and fused by the controller and then
synced back with the switches again.
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Fig. 1. The proposed AIS based intrusion detection system BIDS for SDN.
The procedure of BIDS is shown in Fig. 2. The detail of
each component is discussed below.
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Fig. 2. Detection procedure flowchart of BIDS.
A. Antibody Generator
In the antibody generator, binary strings with fixed length l
are generated randomly as the immature antibodies. To extract
the patterns of network traffic, information from TCP packets
are converted to binary strings. After studying the pattern
of real intrusion packets from the NSL-KDD dataset1, we
choose the following information: source IP address, source
port number, destination IP address, destination port number,
application protocol, type of service, and packet length, as
shown in Table II, constructing a l = 136 bits binary string.
For the intrusion types recorded in the NSL-KDD dataset,
these fields experience the most significant deviation between
intrusion packets and normal packets. Theoretically, all the
information in a packet can be used as the signature. However,
as the storage and computational cost grow exponentially with
the length of the binary string l, it is not feasible to add all
the information that can potentially denote the abnormality.
1The following types of intrusion data in NSL-KDD dataset are used:
back, buffer overflow, guess passwd, ipsweep, loadmodule, neptune, nmap,
pod, portsweep, rootkit, satan, smurf, teardrop, warezclient.
TABLE II
INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM IP PACKETS
Name of Field Binary String Length
Source IP Address 32 bits
Source Port 16 bits
Destination IP Address 32 bits
Destination Port 16 bits
Application Protocol 16 bits
Type of Service 8 bits
Packet Length 16 bits
Total 136 bits
B. Antibody Trainer
Negative selection is performed by the antibody trainer.
The immature antibodies will be compared with normal traffic
datasets collected locally by the switch, which is also a
set of binary 136-bit-long strings. Similar to previous work
[3], [1], assume that during the traffic collection period no
intrusion happens (as in our production network environment,
an intrusion is a low probability event). Whenever an immature
antibody is matched with normal traffic, it is extinguished and
only those who do not match any normal traffic strings remain
as the mature antibodies.
C. Intrusion Collector
To achieve more accurate detection, we collect real intrusion
data from the NSL-KDD dataset, and extract the same infor-
mation as the antibodies into binary strings as the intrusion
set. We directly append the non-self set to the antibody set in
the controller through the antibody fuser discussed below. As
the detection mechanism in AIS-based intrusion is as simple
as binary string matching, putting real intrusion data in as
antibodies will make the string matching more efficient.
D. Antibody Fuser
Once the collection of local mature antibody set Ai and
intrusion set Ii in each switch i are complete, the SDN
controller will send them to the antibody fuser, which is
responsible for carrying out the following three tasks.
- Take the intersection of the mature antibody sets from all
switches ∩
i
Ai.
- Take the union of the intrusion sets from all switches
∪
i
Ni.
- Unite the two sets from the previous two steps, to create
the final antibody set FA and dispatch to all the switches.
FA = (∩
i
Ai) ∪ (∪
i
Ni)
We argue that the antibody fuse process can reduce the
false-positive rate, and increase the true-negative rate. As each
user has personalised online behaviour, the traffic patterns vary
between different switches. As shown in Fig. 3, the rectangle
in each subfigure is a two-dimensional representation of the
universal set of 136 bits binary strings U . The strings are
classified into two categories, either self (represented by the
white area) S or non-self (represented by the grey area) N ,
i.e., U = S ∪ N,S ∩ N = . Let the traffic experienced by
each switch i be Ti, in which self set is Si and non-self set is
Ni. We have
Ti = Si +Ni,
U =
n∑
i=1
Ti,
where n is the total number of switches in the network.
To simplify the calculation, we assume that the traffic
experienced by different switches has no overlap, which means
Ti ∩ Tj = , Si ∩ Sj = , Ni ∩Nj = , i 6= j.
The antibody set trained by switch i is Ai = U − Si
The false positive rate generated using Ai is
FPi =
S − Si
U
After fusing the antibody sets trained by switch 1, 2, ...n,
the antibody set generated will be
A1...n = U −
n∑
i=1
Si
The false positive rate FP1...n using the fused antibody set
A1...n is
FP1...n =
A1...n − I
U
=
S −∑ni=1 Si
U
=
S
U
−
∑n
i=1 Si
U
Thus, the false positive rate after using antibody fuser is
FP1...n = γ −
∑n
i=1 Si
U
where γ = SU is a constant. Obviously, FP1...n decreases with
the number of fused antibody sets n.
A two-dimentional representation of the fusing process is
shown in Fig. 3(a), the local traffic experienced by switch
1 T1 is represented by the yellow ellipse, most of which is
normal traffic (the overlap region with the white area), while
the rest are known intrusions N1 (the area overlapped with
grey area). In the local IDS in switch 1, the training set is
represented as area labelled “1” in Fig. 3(b). As a result, the
antibody set A1 trained by switch 1 is the shadowed area. The
area overlapped with the white zone, which is labelled in “2”,
is the false-positive results. In other words, the traffic strings
in zone “2” is normal traffic, but switch 1 will deem them
as abnormal because it has not seen these strings before, and
hence false alarms will be issued for them. As shown in Fig.
3(b), the false-positive rate is relatively high for switch 1, due
to its limited training set, or in other words, because it has not
seen much of the superset of traffic.
The traffic of switch 2 is shown in Fig. 3(c) which covers
a different area from switch 1. With the antibody fuser, the
antibody and intrusion sets of switch 1 & 2 can be fused
(A1∩A2)∩(I1∪I2), as shown in the shadow area of Fig. 3(d).
The false-positive rate has shrunk to the area labelled with “4”.
From here we can see that, with more different antibody sets
fused, the false-positive rate will be reduced.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Data Preparation
1) Immature Antibody Set: A number of 136-bit binary
strings were generated randomly as the immature antibody.
In theory, the immature antibody set should be an exhaustive
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3. The fuse process of two antibody sets in two-dimensional represen-
tation of the universe of 136 bits binary strings.
list of all possible 136-bit binary strings. However, that will
be a total of 2136 binary strings, which is impossible to be
stored or computed in reasonable time with today’s technology.
Thus, we generate a relatively large number (compared to
the training dataset) – 5 million unique binary strings, as the
immature antibody set for the experiment.
2) Self Data Set: The self training dataset used for this
work is collected from real traffic. The self sets were collected
by four switches with different online behaviour preference for
5 days, during which a total of 65,328 unique TCP packets
were logged and converted to 136 bits binary strings. The size
of each self set is shown in Table III.
TABLE III
FEATURES OF TRAINING SETS.
switch Number Intrusion Strings Number Self Strings
switch 1 2423 11790
switch 2 2423 13239
switch 3 2423 12979
switch 4 2423 27320
Total 9702 65328
3) Intrusion Data Set: As discussed broadly, the DARPA2
and KDD’993 datasets are not suitable to serve as viable
training datasets [10]. Thus, an advanced dataset NSL-KDD4
is used as the intrusion training dataset. A total of 9702
intrusion strings were extracted from the dataset and were
dispatched evenly across four switches. Thus, there are 2423
strings in the local intrusion set from each switch. Table III
gives a breakdown of the number of training strings used in
each switch.
To test the true-negative rate of BIDS , real port scanning
attacks launched by Nmap5 are recorded and mapped into 136-
bit binary strings. A total of 8895 binary strings are collected
as the intrusion test set.
B. Matching Rules Setup
There are many string matching rules, some obvious ones
are Hamming distance, edit distance, and r-contiguous bits. In
this paper, the more immunologically plausible r-contiguous
2https://www.ll.mit.edu/r-d/datasets
3http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
4http://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/nsl.html
It is believed to have fixed some problems of KDD’99.
5http://nmap.org/
bits rule is adopted. In the r-contiguous bits rule, two strings
with the same length match if they have at least r contiguous
identical bits. The threshold r determines the minimum affinity
of two strings given. If the threshold r is too small, the rule will
fail to distinguish the intrusion string from intrusion string, and
thus result in a high false-positive rate. When r is too big, the
matching time will grow exponentially, besides, it will be more
difficult to match the intrusion string with the antibody string,
which results a high false-negative rate. In this work, different
values of r are examined during the evaluation experiment,
performing the following matches:
- Match the test set of intrusion (non-self) strings with the
test set of self strings;
- Match two test sets of self strings collected at different
time slots by the same switch.
According to our experiment, when the threshold r is any
value lower than 26, the number of matched strings in the self
and non-self set is overwhelming. In an extrema case, when
r ≤ 18, the self and non-self sets match 100%. When r ≥ 26,
most of the self strings fail to match with non-self strings.
Thus, the value r = 26 is chosen for the r-contiguous matching
rule in the experiment. There are reports investigating more
appropriate rules for the AIS-based intrusion detection, but it
is beyond the scope of this paper.
C. Results
The results of the experiments are presented in this section.
The performance of BIDS is mainly evaluated in terms of two
metrics: false-positive and true-negative. False-positive occurs
when a normal string is classified as intrusion, while true-
negative is the situation that an alarm is generated as soon as
a intrusion takes place [1].
The results calculated by BIDS with and without the use of
the antibody fuser are compared. Comparison with previous
AIS-based IDS is presented in detail. The computational cost
of BIDS using the antibody fuser is also compared against
other popular IDS proposed for SDN. The main purpose of
the experiments is to demonstrate that the use of centralised
SDN control – antibody fuser improves the accuracy of BIDS,
both in terms of false-positive and true-negative.
TABLE IV
FALSE POSITIVE RATE OF ALL TEST SETS USING FUSED ANTIBODY SETS
WITH ALL POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS.
Fused Antibody Sets Self Set 1 Self Set 2 Self Set 3 Self Set 4
A1 ∩A2 0.00% 0.00% 88.64% 87.57%
A2 ∩A3 86.64% 0.00% 0.00% 86.49%
A3 ∩A4 90.00% 89.78% 0.00% 0.00%
A1 ∩A3 0.00% 91.03% 0.00% 92.12%
A2 ∩A4 86.28% 0.00% 70.03% 0.00%
A1 ∩A4 0.00% 86.91% 84.55% 0.00%
A1 ∩A2 ∩A3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 85.96%
A2 ∩A3 ∩A4 82.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
A1 ∩A2 ∩A4 0.00% 0.00% 58.06% 0.00%
A1 ∩A3 ∩A4 0.00% 78.70% 0.00% 0.00%
A1 ∩A2 ∩A3 ∩A4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1) False-Positive Rate: We have fused the mature antibody
sets trained by the 4 switches (noted as A1, A2, A3, and A4)
with all possible combinations. As the self sets collected
Fig. 4. False-positive rate calculated by using various combinations of fused
antibody sets test on four self set collected by four switches.
in different switches (which work as the training datasets)
experience different patterns, the IDS is expected to produce
high false-positive rate when the local antibody set trained
in one switch is tested by the self set collected by another
switch. The experimental results are listed in Table IV. The
four self sets collected by the four switches have been tested
on all possible combinations of fused mature antibody sets. In
the column “Fused Antibody Set”, the antibody sets fused are
presented. The average false-positive rates of the antibody set
fusing different number of local antibody sets are presented
as bar charts in Fig. 4. The X-axis of Fig. 4 represents the
four test datasets collected from the four switches, and the
legend represent the numbers of antibody sets that are fused.
It is worth mentioning that the blue bars on the far left of the
results, represent the results tested by a single local antibody
set, without using the antibody fuser. The Y-axis in Fig. 4 is
the false-positive rate calculated as a percentage.
In contrast to the results testing on the single antibody set
(the blue bar on the far left of each self set experiment),
the fused antibody sets can significantly reduce the false-
positive rate. As obviously shown by the trend of result as
the number of fused sets grow, the false-positive rate reduces
significantly with more and more local antibody sets are fused.
In an extreme case, when all the switches’ antibody sets are
fused, as shown by the purple bar on the far right end in all
results, the false-positive rate drops to 0. This is because with
all the local antibody sets being fused, the fused antibody set
has been trained by all the self sets, and will not make false
positive decisions. We argue that although the training sets of
the switches are used to test the fused antibody set, which
generates a little bit ideal result such as 0% false-positive rate
when all the local antibody sets are fused, the trend shown in
Fig. 4 demonstrates the decline on the false-positive rate with
our BIDS algorithm. It evident that in an artificial immune
system based intrusion detection, which entirely depends on
learning what has been defined as normal and detect anything
that deviates from normality, the global view provided by SDN
can reduce the false-positive rate caused by the limitation on
the vision of local traffic pattern.
2) True-Negative Rate: The four intrusion records are
merged to the antibody set fused in the above section. The final
Fig. 5. True-negative rate calculated by using different number of fused
antibody sets test on intrusion set collected.
Fig. 6. True-negative rate comparison with BIDS and related work.
antibody set is tested over the intrusion test set collected from
real port scanning attacks performed by Nmap. The results
are presented in Fig. 5. The legend shows the number of
intrusion sets fused. The Y-axis is the percentage of intrusions
successfully detected. The bar at the far left is the true-negative
rate before any intrusion sets have been fused. Apparently,
the true-negative rate is very low, due to the limited immature
antibodies used in the training process (as stated in Section
IV-A1, we could not afford using a exhaustive list of all
possible 136-bit binary strings, thus we cannot achieve a
high true-negative rate of real intrusions before any intrusion
training set is fused). However, the intrusion true-negative rate
soars with the number of intrusion sets fused to the antibody
set increases. When more than half of the switches’ intrusion
sets are fused, BIDS is able to detected the majority of the
intrusions strings tested. The improvement on true-negative
rate by using antibody fuser is evident.
Comparison between BIDS and previous work on IDS using
artificial immune system [1], [2] is presented with pie chart in
Fig. 6. True-negative rates in previous work are the average
value obtained from all tests reported. The true-negative rate
of BIDS is obtained by taking the average of the tests result
using 2, 3, and 4 fused intrusion records. The number in the
pie’s shadow area denotes the number of binary strings in the
intrusion set used, while the number in the blank area is the
the number of strings detected. As it can be seen from Fig.
6, not only a much larger intrusion set is used, BIDS also
outperforms previous work with the fusion of intrusion sets.
As shown in the far left pie in Fig. 6, the true-negative rate
of IDS by Kim et al. is quite low with only 12.31%, due to
the inappropriate threshold and the fact that the antibody set is
too small [2]. Results from the IDS proposed by Hofmeyr et
al., as shown in the middle pie in Fig. 6, demonstrate a much
better performance, reaching 44% [1]. This is probably due to
the fact that, as claimed by the authors, an exhaustive list of all
possible binary strings was generated as the immature antibody
set for the training process. As for our results, as shown in the
far right pie in Fig. 6, although we could not afford to use an
exhaustive list of all possible binary strings as the immature
antibody set, BIDS achieves the highest average true-negative
rate.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF CPU USAGE FOR PREVIOUS IDS FOR SDN AND BIDS.
IDSs for SDN CPU Usage (%)
Entropy based with sFlow [5] 39%
TRW-CB with sFlow [12] 39%
Entropy based with Native OF [5] 61%
TRW-CB with Native OF [12] 58%
BroFlow when 5000 packets/s [11] 100%
Proposed IDS – BIDS 15.3%
3) CPU Usage: Computational cost is a key performance
indicator for any IDS, especially when this runs in-network.
In Table V, we compare the average CPU usage of BIDS
against related IDS for SDN that we discussed earlier in the
paper [5], [12], [11]. These proposed SDN IDS are based on
flow operations, and are target on one specific intrusion type
only, DoS. As AIS based IDS could detect any deviance from
normal traffic, thus, it is able to detect a wide spectrum of
intrusions, including “Zero-day” attacks. Besides, as the AIS
algorithm works by performing binary string matching, it is
more efficient than the other machine learning algorithms such
as deep learning, as can be evident by the result of [5] and
BIDS shown in Table V. Generally, BIDS performs better than
the other SDN IDS. The light-weightness of AIS algorithms
is proven.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented an Artificial Immune Sys-
tem (AIS)-based IDS for Software Defined Networks (SDN)
– BIDS . Based on traditional AIS intrusion detection, it takes
advantage of the global network view provided by SDN to
collect and fuse the mature antibody sets trained and the
intrusions recoded by the local switches, to achieve lower
false-positive rates and higher true-negative rate.
The contributions of BIDS have been demonstrated over
a prototype testbed implementation. The analysed normal
dataset was gathered from real traffic in a research office envi-
ronment. During 5 days, network traffic was generated follow-
ing different online behaviour and collected from 4 switches,
free from any known intrusions. The intrusion training set
was generated from the NDL-KDD dataset, which contains
14 kinds of intrusions, and the test set was gathered from real
port scanning attacks launched by Nmap. In traditional AIS
based IDS, a mature antibody set is generated after negative
selecting the normal traffic collected by the switch, where
a match denotes an anomaly activity. The accuracy entirely
depends on the normal traffic set selected to train the antibody.
We argue that this IDS is constrained by the local traffic the
switch has seen, and thus will lead to high false-positive rate
when new normal traffic appears (which is common nowadays
as new web applications keep popping up). By using the global
view of the network provided by SDN, we fuse the antibody
sets trained by every switch in the network as well as the
intrusions recorded into a global antibody set, and distribute
it to all the switches. This is equivalent to that antibody set
being trained by the traffic flow over the entire network. With
regards to these two metrics, false-positive and true-negative
rates, BIDS is able to outperform the previous work on AIS
based IDS and IDS using other mechinism for SDN with less
cpu usage.
For future work, we are planning to improve the AIS
algorithm by finding a more efficient presentation to describe
the traffic pattern. Secondly, we will gather more normal and
abnormal training datasets, to achieve better performance of
the system.
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